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[19 C. (2d)

thereby caused to collect was a contributing cause of the
flooding. It must be remembered that these cases are here
on appeal from judgments entered after orders granting nonsuits, and all the evidence must be viewed and every reasonable inference drawn favorably to plaintiffs. There is undeniably sufficient evidence to require the submission of the
cases to t.he jury on that question of fact.
Summing up, we have cases where public agencies, with
no proprietary right so to do, have collected surface waters
by the install a tion of drains, have discharged those waters
into a natural watercourse, and have failed to provide adequate means of escape for those waters into the ocean well
knowing that their conduct would cause the flooding of
plaintiffs' premises. As a result of that conduct, the waters
discharged in the watercourse· exceeded its capacity and could
not escape through the inadequate outlet, and plaintiffs' land
and the improvements thereon, not riparian to the stream
being three miles away, and not having theretofore been
subject to overflow by any of the waters, are flooded and damaged. The majority decision is contrary to the firmly established law in California and the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions .. It will not only result in a grievous miscarriage of justice in the cases now under consideration, but will
cause great confusion in the law on the subject here involved.
In my opinion the judgments should be reversed.

Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December
12, 1941. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
Houser, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J., acting
pro tcm.
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JAMIE 0 'HARA et a1., Appellants, v. LOS ANGELES
COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, Respondent.
(1] Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to

[2]

1

CURTIS, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the
dissenting opinion.

O'HARA V.

[3]

[4]

[5]

-State Constitutional Guaranty.-Compensation for private
property taken or damaged for public use must be mn.de under
Const. art. I, § 14, only when the taking or damaging is not
so e~sential to the public health, safety, and morals as to be
justified under the police· power and the injury is one which
would give rise to a cause of action by the owner if it were
inflicted by a private person.
Waters - Surface Waters - Protection Against - Confining
Waters-Improvements in Stream-Diversion.-A lower riparian owner has no redress for injury to his land caused by
improvements in tlie stream when there has been no diversion
of water out of its natural channel.
Id.-Surface Waters-:-Protection Against-Public Improvements- Increasing Velocity of Stream Waters.-A county
flood control district which replaced dikes that bordered upon
a river with concrete levees and constructed a concrete embankment running at right angles to the levees, thereby obstructing the drainage of surface waters into the river, is not
liable to property owners near the river, when due to heavy
rainstorms and an inadequate outlet, the stream waters flowed
at a speed heightened by the improvements, burst through the
banks of the river and damaged the property, and the surface
waters flooded it.
Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Obstructing Flow.
A private landowner may not obstruct the flow of surface
waters that naturally drain a~rOSSi his property from adjoining lands.
Id. - Surface Waters - Protection Against-Public Improvements-Right to Obstruct Flow.---A governmental agency in
constructing public improvements may. validly exercise its
police power to obstruct the flow of surface waters not running in a natural channel without making compensation for
the resulting damages.

[3J See 27 R. C. L. 1146.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Eminent Domain, § 43 (1); [2J
Waters, §396; [3,5J Waters, §400; [4] Waters, §391j' [6] Appeal and Error, § 1431.
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[6] Appeal - Determination - Reversal ~ Grounds - Failure to
Amend Complaint After Demurrer Sustained.-When a demurrer to a complaint is properly sustained with leave to
amend, and the plaintiffs decline to do so, the judgment will
not be reversed on appeal in order to allow an amendment,
since by declining to amend the plaintiffs take the position
that whatever facts they might prove in support of their
action were alleged in the complaint and they voluntarily
base their case upon the demurrer.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action against flood control district for damages for injuries to land as the result of flooding. Judgment for defendant after the sustaining of a demurrer to the complaint,
and plaintiffs' refusal to amend, affirmed.
Joseph K. Coady and Henry K. Elder for Appellants,
J. H. 0 'Connor, County Counsel, S. V. O. Prichard,
Assistant County Counsel, and Arthur S. Loveland, Deputy
County Counsel, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs are the owners of certain land
in Los Angeles County near the Los Angeles River. The
Los Angeles County Flood Control District replaced the low
permeable dikes that bordered the river with concrete levees,
and constructed a concrete embankment running at right
angles to the levees away from the river. These improvements, constructed for the purpose of flood control, increased
the velocity of the water flowing in the river by preventing
it from spreading out over adjoining lands, and obstructed
the drainage of surface waters into the river. The only
provision for drainage of the area created by the levee and
the embankment was a four foot culvert opening into the
river at a point near the junction of the levee and the embankment. On March 2, 1938, a heavy rainstorm occurred.
The water flowed in the river at a speed heightened by defendant's improvements, burst through the river banks and
damaged plaintiffs' property. The surface waters, prevented by defendant's improvements from draining into the
river, flooded plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs thereupon brought
this action against the flood contrQldistrict, claiming the

right to recover damages under article I, section 14 of the
California Constitution. Defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiffs have appealed after
refusing to amend.
[1] Compensation for private property taken or damaged
for·· a public use must be made under article I, section 14,
only when the taking or damaging of property is not so
essential to the public health, safety, and morals as to be
justified under the "police power," and the injury is one
which would give rise to a cause of action on the part of the
owner if it were inflicted by a private person. (Archer v.
Oity of Los Angeles, ante, p. 19 [119 Pac. (2d) 1], this day
decided.)
[2] A lower riparian owner has no redress for injury to
his land caused by improvements in the stream when there
has been no diversion of water out of its natural channel.
(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra.) [3] The present
complaint, therefore, does not state a good cause of action
against the defendant for injuries caused by the overflow of
the water flowing in the stream.
[4] In California a private land owner may not obstruct
the flow of surface waters that naturally drain across his
property from adjoining land. (Los Angeles Oemetery Association v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461 [37 Pac. 375].)
[5] In the present case the plaintiffs would therefore have
a cause of action against a private person who obstructed the
flow of surface waters from their land. A governmental
agency, however, in constructing public improvements such
as streets and highways, may validly exercise its "police
power" to obstruct the flow of surface waters not running in
a natural channel without making compensation for the resulting damage. (Corcoran v. City of Benicia, 96 Cal. 1
[30 Pac. 798, 31 Am. St. Rep. 171] ; Oonniff v. San Francisco,
67 Cal. 45 [7 Pac.· 41] ; Jefferis v. Oity of Monterey Park,
14 Cal. App. (2d) 113 [57 Pac. (2d) 1374]; Lampe v. San
Francisco, 124 Cal. 546 [57 Pac. 461, 1001] ; see 7 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 295 et seq.) The construction of improvements along
a stream for purposes of flood control is no less essential to
the public health and safety than the grading of streets
(see Gray v.Reclamation District, 174 Cal. 622 [T63 Pac.
1024] ; Lamb v. Reclamation District, 73 Cal. 125 [14 Pac.
625, 2 Am. St. Rep. 775] ; Jackson v. United Stat(}s, 230 U. S.

~I
~
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1 [33 Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. Ed. 1363]; Hughes v. United
States, 230 U. S. 24 [33 Sup. Ct. 1019, 57 L. Ed. 1374);
Franklin v. United States, 101 Fed. (2d) 459), and a governmental agency should no more be liable in the one case
than in the other for obstructing surface waters. Plaintiffs
do not allege that the obstructed surface waters werc flowing
in a natural channel. The defendant therefore is under no
obligation to compensate 'for the damage caused by the
obstruction.
[6] Plaintiffs admit that the improvements were constructed by the defendant for the purpose of fioodcontrol
and the facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint have been acceptedas true. It therefore appears as a matter of law
that defendant was properly exercising its police power and
there is no reason for returning the case to the lower court
for trial. Likewise there is no basis for giving plaintiffs
another opportunity to amend their complaint. By declining to amend after the sustaining of the demurrer by the
trial court, plaintiffs took the position that whatever facts
they might prove in support of their actioD were alleged in
the complaint and they voluntarily based their case upon the
demurrer. (Goldtree v. Spreckels, 135 Cal. 666, 672 [67
Pac. 1091] ; Sutter v. San Francisco, 36 OaL 112, 116, 117.)
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
The majority decision is predicated on the police power
doctrine and the main authority cited therefor in Archer
v. City of Los Angeles, L. A. Nos. 17,612 and 17,613 (ante,
p. 19 [119 Pac. (2d) 1]), this day decided. I pointed
out in my dissent in those cases that although the majority opinion discussed the police power, it came to no
conclusion in regard to its application to those cases; that
discussion was dictum. In the instant case that dictum is
the only authority relied upon for the majority decision.
This is a practical illustration from a theoretical standpoint
of "lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." That is. a
dictum is set forth in one case to be used as authority for
the decision in another case decided at the same time. This
process is rendered even more obnoxious when the dictum is
unsound, as is the case here.

Nov. 1941.]
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In my dissenting. opinion in the A.llison and Archer cases,
I have endeavored to point out the inapplicability of the
police power doctrine to a factual situation where property
has been taken or damaged for a public improvement such
as in the ease at bar. What I said thereis applicable to the
case at. bar, and for the reasons there given and under the
authorities there cited, the judgment in the case at bar should
be reversed.
Curtis, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December
12, 1941. Curtis,J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
Houser, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J., acting
pro tem.

[L. A. Nos. 17067, 17481. In Bank.

Nov. 24, 1941.]

M. C. DUTTON, Respondent, v. INTERSTATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (a Oorporation), Appellant.
(Two Cases.)
[1] OiI~Contracts,

etc.-Leases-Assignment-As Transfer of
Realty: Frauds,Statute of-Agreements Relating to Real
Property-Assignment of Interest iri .Oil.-An· agreement assigning a fractional interest in the oil and hydrocarbons produced under an oil and gas lease operates to transfer an
interest in realproperty,and is required by the statutes to
be in writing.. (Civ. Code, § 1624 (4) ;CodeCiv. Proc.,
§ 1973 (4).)
[2] Frauds, Statute of-Agreements Relating to Real Property-SharingProfits.-A contract whereby a party is to have a
fractional interest in the net profits from a transaction involving the procurement of an oil ·lease is not required to be
in writing.
[3] Id.-Operation-Estoppel to Assert Statute-Agreement to
Reduce to Writing: Trusts-Resulting Trusts-Effect of Stat[3J See 12 Cal. Jur. 934.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Oil, § 34; Frauds, Statute of, § 36;
[2] Frauds, Statute of, § 36; E3J Frauds, Statute of, § '59(1) ;
Trusts, §95; [4] Contracts, § 210; [5] Contracts, § 274.,
19 C. (2d)-3

